We study the Nash Equilibrium of three-candidate unidimensional spatial competition when candidates differ in their non-policy characteristics (valence). If the voters' policy preferences are represented by a strictly convex loss function, and if the voter density is unimodal and symmetric, then a unique, modulo symmetry, local Nash Equilibrium exists under fairly plausible conditions. The global Nash Equilibrium, however, exists when only one candidate has a valence advantage (or disadvantage) while the other two candidates have the same valence.
Introduction

1
The median voter theorem (Hotelling 1929; Downs 1957; and Black 1958 ) is one of the most widely used results in analytical political economy. In a setup also known as the Hotelling-Downs model, the theorem states that two-candidate unidimensional spatial competition has a unique pure strategy Nash Equilibrium (PSNE) in which both candidates adopt the policy most preferred by the median voter. In the model, there is a continuum of voters. The voting is sincere, non-stochastic, and without abstention. The candidates are vote-maximizing, and they may di¤er only in their policies; otherwise they are identical. Although the model is commonly used to study two-candidate competition when candidates are homogeneous, it cannot be easily extended to other cases: More speci…cally, the PSNE does not exists when the candidates have di¤erent non-policy characteristics (also known as valence) in twocandidate competition 2 , nor when three homogeneous candidates compete (Eaton and Lipsey 1975) . In this paper, however, we show that a unique (modulo symmetry) PSNE exists when one considers competition among three candidates with valence di¤erences.
In our base model (presented in Section 2) we impose two main restrictions on the standard Hotelling-Downs model: Voters'policy preferences are represented by a strictly convex loss function; and the density of voters is both unimodal and symmetric. We then show that a (modulo symmetry) unique Local Nash Equilibrium (LNE)
exists for a large set of valence parameters. The set of parameters for which the PSNE exists is smaller, yet it is non-empty. For a symmetric density of voters, the PSNE exists only when two of the three competing candidates have the same valence, and the valence di¤erence between these candidates and the third one exceeds a certain threshold. That is, for PSNE to exists, two of the three candidates must have the 1 I would like to thankŞule Atahan-Evrenk, Darlene Chisholm, Tim Groseclose, Hsueh-Ling Hyunh, Dilip Mookherjee, and Jörgen Weibull for comments. All errors are mine 2 For a partial list of people who established this claim, see (Groseclose 2001 , footnote 10).
same appeal, and the appeal of the third candidate must be su¢ ciently di¤erent from the appeal of the other two. Further, under an alternative set of assumptions, such as asymmetric voter density or plurality-maximizing candidates, the PSNE exists for a much larger set of parameters including cases where each candidate has di¤erent valence.
We …nd that the location of candidates in equilibrium depends on the number of the candidate(s) with the highest valence. When only one candidate, say Candidate 2, has higher valence than the rest, in any LNE, Candidate 2 locates between the two lower-valence candidates (Candidates 1 and 3). Candidates 1 and 3 locate equidistantly from the center, and receive the same vote share. Candidate 2 is located closer to the candidate with the second highest valence. A PSNE for this case does not exist unless Candidates 1 and 3 have the same valence. In the PSNE, Candidate 2 is located at the center.
When two of the candidates have the same valence and the third one has a lower valence, the former candidates choose the same policy platform on one side of the center, receiving the same vote share. The lower valence candidate locates at the other side of (and further away from) the center. His vote share is lower than that of the other two candidates. 3 We characterize both the LNE and the PSNE of the base model for a general strictly convex loss function (that is, for a general strictly concave utility function).
We show that the quadratic loss function, commonly used in models of two-candidate competition, restricts the set of candidate valences under which an LNE exists; it rules out many plausible equilibria. This does not happen under many other loss functions.
When we consider some modi…cations of the base model, such as plurality maximizing candidates or asymmetric voter density, we …nd that the LNE of the base model is also an LNE in these models. More important, in these models PSNE exists for a much larger set of parameters including the case in which none of the candidates have the same valence. Although both the model and its extensions mentioned above are quite stylized, they have two advantages. Both the LNE and the PSNE (i) are unique (modulo symmetry) when they exist, and (ii) can be characterized analytically. Thus, for instance, the model could be used for comparative statics concerning both marginal and large changes in candidate valences. 4 Further, given the existence of a unique equilibrium with an analytical solution, the model could also serve as a benchmark case for understanding the e¤ects of additional modelling assumptions, such as probabilistic voting, on the equilibrium outcome. considers features such as party loyalty, policy discounting, and abstention in a unidimensional setup. Scho…eld and Sened (2006) has an integrated and more detailed approach. They study models of policy making that include many factors such as post election bargaining, activist valence, party principals, and a multi-dimensional policy space. Characterizing PSNE of these models in analytical form is not possible in general; the authors estimate the equilibrium using simulations based on country speci…c estimates of several parameters in their models. Adams (1999) runs simulations to calculate the PSNE of a more stylized model: three candidate competition 4 For instance, Evrenk (2004) studies the support for anti-corruption reforms in a setup with three candidates who di¤er both in the level of their honesty and ability. The reform will raise the minimum level of honesty among the candidates, and thus will change the valence vector signi…cantly. A candidate's support for the reform depends on the change in his vote shares before and after the reform. When we have an equilibrium in analytical form both before and after the reform, one can determine the sign of the change in vote share.
with valence di¤erences under probabilistic voting and uniform voter density. The structure of the equilibrium in his Figures 2B and 2C look similar to the equilibrium locations that we …nd in Propositions 1 and 2 without probabilistic voting. 5 Chisik and Lemke (2006) studies a model of simultaneous move unidimensional spatial competition among three homogeneous candidates without probabilistic voting. They prove that under a uniform density a continuum of PSNE exists when one assumes that candidates care only about winning a majority of votes. This, however, is a strong assumption. It implies that a candidate is indi¤erent between receiving a 49 percent vote share and no vote at all, if another candidate receives 50 percent of votes in both situations. Hug (1995) studies PSNE of three-party competition when there is uncertainty about the policy that a party will implement, -extending Enelow and Hinich (1984, section 7.4) to three-party competition. This model is isomorphic to a special case of the model we study, as we discuss in greater detail at the end of Section 2.
The model
Consider an Hotelling-Downs model of political competition where each candidate j 2 f1; 2; 3g chooses a policy platform, p j , from R. Unlike the standard model, we assume that each candidate j has exogenous non-policy characteristics (known as valence and denoted by v j 2 R) favored by voters, such as competency, honesty, and charisma. 6 There is a continuum of voters (of measure one), and i denotes the voter whose most preferred policy platform is i 2 R. Voting is sincere: i votes for candidate j who provides the highest U j i (p j ; v j ), and randomizes when there are more than one such j's, where 5 However, using these simulations and our results, one cannot identify how probabilistic voting would a¤ect the equilibrium. Because, under the uniform voter density used in these simulations, no equilibrium exists without probabilistic voting. 6 For more on valence, see Stokes (1963) .
In (1), L(x) : R + ! R + is the "loss function" representing the voter's policy preferences, and ji p j j is the distance between i and the policy platform of candidate j.
Let f (i) : I ! R + denote the the density of i. We assume that: (A1 ) The loss function, L(:), is twice continuously di¤erentiable and strictly convex with L 0 (0) = 0 and
The domain of the density is (i) closed, convex and symmetric around zero, and the density is (ii) continuous, (iii) symmetric with
(iv) di¤erentiable on all its domain with the possible exceptions at zero and sup I,
(at these points we assume that at least the directional derivatives exist), and (v) unimodal; (A3 ) Each candidate j simultaneously chooses his policy platform to maximize his vote share, V j (p j ; p j ).
We study the Nash Equilibria of the above model in which each candidate receives a non-zero vote share, -if a candidate receives no votes in equilibrium, his policy platform does not matter for any practical purposes. The existence of a global equilibrium is hard to verify, so, we follow a method proposed in Scho…eld (2005) . We …rst identify the set of Local Nash Equilibria, LNE, i.e. any strategy pro…le (p 1 ; p 2 ; p 3 ) where p j maximizes V j (p j ; p j ) over a (small) " neighborhood of p j . We, then, use simulations to check if a given LNE is a PSNE. 7 We normalize candidate valences as v 2 v 1 v 3 . Then, the following cases are collectively exhaustive and mutually exclusive; (a) 
]. A necessary (su¢ -cient) condition for the existence is
For non-zero vote shares we need p 3 < sup I.
, and the su¢ cient condition becomes
Next, we consider case (d). Let F (i) denote the cumulative density of i, and let z be de…ned by
if the LNE exists, then it is unique modulo symmetry, and is given by
We prove Propositions 1 and 2 in the Appendix. Here we …rst discuss the equilibrium locations and the vote shares. When one candidate has higher valence than the others, the lower-valence candidates are located symmetrically around the mean, When two of the candidates have exactly the same valence, and the third one has a lower valence, case (d), the policy platforms of high-valence candidates converge, 8 To ensure the existence and uniqueness of z, a su¢ cient condition is that the valence di¤erence is small, more precisely,
. To see that under this assumption there exists a unique
However, they do not converge on the center. These two candidates locate on one side of the center and the third (lower-valence) candidate locates on the other side. The unimodal and symmetric voter density implies that the higher-valence candidates'platform is closer to the center, i.e., jzj < jz + L 1 ( 3 )j.
Given the equilibrium locations, we can calculate equilibrium vote shares. As Lemma 2 in Appendix shows, in any LNE, all voters located between a low valence candidate and a high valence candidate vote for the latter. Thus, in (b) and (c),
), where Candidate 2 receives the rest of the votes,
, and each of the high valence candidates receives
or, equivalently, F (z), fraction of votes. The LNE vote shares in cases (b) and (c)
can not be further ordered. For instance, depending on 1 in some equilibria V 1 is less than V 2 and in some other equilibria V 1 is larger than V 2 . 9 In case (d), we can rank the equilibrium vote shares of all candidates:
high-valence candidate receives a larger vote share than the candidate with the lower
It is also worth noting that in cases (b) and (c), the low valence candidates are not locally competing with each other in the equilibrium. That is to say, when one of them locally deviates from his equilibrium platform, then the vote share of the other low valence candidate remains unchanged. In contrast, in case (d) when the low valence candidate locally deviates from his LNE location, the vote share of all candidates change.
Before we study when LNE is PSNE, let us note an implication of the quadratic loss function speci…cation on LNE. Quadratic loss function has been used extensively in the literature on two-candidate competition with valence di¤erences, (Groseclose (2001) is a notable exception); when the loss function is quadratic, it is quite easy to calculate the location of the indi¤erent voter analytically. Yet, using this speci…cation in three-candidate competition restricts the set of valence di¤erences under which an 9 As we discuss below, in PSNE we can always order the vote shares.
LNE exists, ruling out many plausible LNE. To see why, let us compare the set of LNE under L(x) = x 2 with the same set under L(x) = x 4 , -or, for that matter, under any L(x) = x 2n where n is an integer larger than one. Both loss functions satisfy A1, but L 00 (0) = 2 in the former and L 00 (0) = 0 in the latter. To see how the value of L 00 (0) imposes a lower bound on the set of valence di¤erences, j 's, under which an equilibrium exists, consider the following voter densities that di¤er from each other in terms of support and curvature: (i) Gaussian with zero mean, 
, and
Note that the larger the L 00 (0), the larger is the minimum valence di¤erence, j , that satisfy these inequalities: When L 00 (0) = 0, there exists an LNE for any 0 < < L(sup I). Yet, when L 00 (0) = 2, the LNE does not exists under small valence di¤erences. We need
< < L(sup I) for f 3 (x; 1). Thus, Remark 2 Although under any strictly convex loss function with L 00 (0) = 0 the LNE exists for any > 0, when L 00 (0) = 2, one needs the variance of the voter density to converge to in…nity for this to happen.
Since the variance of the voter density is a parameter over which the modeler has the least control, the constraint pointed out in Remark 2 is especially important when one considers actual voter data. Even more important, the set of valence parameters (and thus the LNE) ruled out by the quadratic speci…cation contain many plausible equilibria. For instance, when voter density is f 3 (x; 1) we are immediately ruling out any LNE where the high valence candidate receives a vote share less than 3 4 .
In case (d), to calculate the equilibrium locations in analytical form, we need a cumulative density in analytical form. 10 Then, one can identify the set of valence di¤erences that give rise to a non-zero vote share LNE as well: ; 0) for f 3 (x; b).
After identifying the LNE, now we can study the PSNE.
Proposition 3 The PSNE exists only in cases (c) and (d).
Proof. To see why there is no PSNE in (b), assume that an LNE with p 2 < 0 is PSNE (one can use symmetric arguments to show that an LNE with p 2 > 0 can not be a PSNE either). Then, by Proposition 1, we have jp 1 p 2 j < jp 3 p 2 j with 
when the voter density is f 2 (x; ), and
(c) and (d). Furthermore, the size of the valence di¤erence between this candidate and the other two candidates must be larger than a threshold that depends on, among other things, the density of voters and the curvature of the loss function. Since the PSNE is a subset of the LNE, PSNE is unique modulo symmetry, and can be characterized analytically.
The method by which we calculate the equilibrium has restrictions on the analysis.
We can characterize equilibrium locations analytically, but we cannot analytically check which ones are PSNE. For this, we use numerical simulations. 11 With this method we can provide examples of PSNE under many speci…c densities, however, unlike the LNE, we are unable to provide su¢ cient conditions for the existence of PSNE that would apply to any density that satis…es A2 assumes that the voter whose most preferred policy platform, or bliss point, is i 2 R has a quadratic loss utility function,
Then, the expected utility
k : when the loss function is quadratic, the e¤ect of uncertainty is reduced to one parameter, the variance. In 11 For all simulations, Mathematica notebooks with calculations are available from the author. Hug (1995) , the density of voters, f (x i ), is twice di¤erentiable, continuous, symmetric around zero, strictly increasing on ( 1; 0) . Thus, his model of policy uncertainty is isomorphic to a model of political competition with valence di¤erences, where The model we use is a variant of the Hotelling-Downs model and it, too, is stylized.
In the unique equilibrium of the Hotelling-Downs model, both candidates choose the same policy and each receives exactly the same vote share. The PSNE of the model we study has two non-plausible features as well. First, the PSNE does not exist for the most likely case, (b). Second, in the PSNE of case (c), the highest valence candidate always receives a majority of votes (V 2 >
2
). 13 To see why, note that in any LNE in 12 For instance, in the proof of Proposition 2, Hug (1995, p. 177), the argument for the existence of equilibrium in (d) is that, using our notation, for any p 0 2 2 (p 2 ; p 2 +L 1 ( 3 )), the function V 2 (p 2 ; p 2 ) has at most one critical value. This, we could not prove or disprove for the case he studies. We can show, on the other hand, that when the loss function is quadratic as in Hug (1995) , the density is given by f 2 (x; 1), and the valence/variance di¤erence is equal to Log[ 2 (or slightly larger than this), the vote share function has two critical points. 13 The PSNE of other three-candidate competition models with non-stochastic voting has similar (c), the high valence candidate is located at the origin and the two other low valence candidates are located equidistantly on both sides. Suppose that we have a PSNE where the high valence candidate does not receive a majority of votes, then he could simply deviate to the location of one of the low valence candidates and receive a vote share that is strictly larger than one half. As we discuss in the next section, under alternative assumptions these features disappear.
Discussion and Conclusion
In this section, we brie ‡y discuss three related issues. First, we examine the role of the assumptions A1, A2 and A3 in establishing the equilibrium. Second, we consider if (and how) these assumptions could be relaxed or altered without eliminating the equilibrium. And, third, we identify how the PSNE of the modi…ed model di¤ers from the PSNE of the base model. Here, we consider only the alternative assumptions under which the LNE of the model is a superset of the LNE of the base model. Then, we conclude.
We assume that the voter preferences are strictly concave (the loss function is strictly convex), A1. With a linear loss function, even an LNE does not exist in any of the cases. 14 Under a strictly concave loss function, even if it exists, the equilibrium is supported by an unusual pattern of voting: both the center voters and the voters located around the supremum and in…mum of I, i.e., the far-right and the far-left voters, always vote for the center candidate.
We impose several conditions on the voter density. These assumptions are suf- 14 The reason is as follows. With a linear loss function, the low-valence candidates still choose the locations of indi¤erence, i.e., Lemma 2 applies. However, if a high valence candidate moves slightly towards the low-valence candidate, then all the voters who voted for the latter will switch to the former. Since by moving slightly towards a low-valence candidate, the high-valence candidate's loss of vote share from the voters on the other side is in…nitesimal, such a deviation always increases his vote share, and thus an LNE does not exist.
that the voter density is unimodal, A2 (v). While this assumption is not necessary, it is not as strong as what one needs for PSNE in standard Downsian spatial multi-candidate competition: "..the number of …rms does not exceed twice the number of nodes," (Eaton and Lipsey 1974, p.35) . To see how unimodality simpli…es the condition for the existence of LNE, note that using (3), the su¢ cient condition in Proposition 1 can be written as
The right-hand side cannot be negative. Thus, if we want to construct a density where these su¢ cient conditions hold generically, then f 0 (x) should decrease around p 3 , and should increase around p 1 . The density need not to be strictly decreasing on each side of the mean. For example, both LNE and PSNE would exist under a density …rst decreasing on each side of the mean, then having a su¢ ciently small local mode su¢ ciently far from the mean. However, with such densities, there will be "holes"in the set of valence di¤erences that gives rise to the LNE, making the characterization of LNE (and, for instance, the discussion of the impact of a quadratic loss function on LNE) especially cumbersome.
We also assume that voters are distributed symmetrically around the mean, A2
(iii). The symmetric density, however, has strong implications on both the existence of PSNE and the structure of equilibrium platforms: Under symmetry, a PSNE exists only when the vector of candidate valences has a certain kind of symmetry and a certain degree of asymmetry. Unlike cases (c) and (d) where two of the three candidates have the same valence, there is no symmetry in candidate valences (and thus no PSNE) in case (b). 15 Since (b) is the most likely case, the PSNE under asymmetric densities must be considered. The analysis of equilibrium under a general asymmetric density is di¢ cult: to study PSNE under an asymmetric density, one has to impose more structure on the density. 16 Through examples we are able to show that the PSNE in case (b) exists under asymmetric voter densities: assume that (i)
f (x) = 1+2x for 1 2 x 0 and f (x) = 1 We assume that candidates are vote-maximizing, A3. Although A3 is the most commonly used objective function in models of multi-candidate competition, it may imply paradoxical behavior: "when there are more [than two] candidates: a candidate who wins outright may, if she moves her position closer to that of a neighbor, increase the number of votes that she receives but at the same time increase the number of voters received by her other neighbor enough that she is no longer the outright winner", (Osborne 1995, p. 278). To check if the equilibrium we …nd is supported by this kind of behavior, we calculate both the LNE and PSNE of the model under the assumption that each candidate j maximizes his plurality, 17 
We …nd that such a paradoxical behavior does not occur in the LNE we …nd. Further, we …nd that Proposition 4 Under plurality maximization, (i) the policy platforms in Propositions 1 and 2 are still LNE, and (ii) now PSNE exists in every case except (a).
Proposition 4 is proved in the Appendix. We do not provide a full characterization of Nash equilibrium under plurality maximization here, as our purpose is to note that the equilibria we …nd in Section 2 are robust. It is worth noting that when each candidate maximizes his plurality, there exists a PSNE in the most likely case, (b).
This is because, a high(er)-valence candidate, such as Candidate 1 in case (b), could however, simply implies a lack of structure. Then, to study the model with an asymmetric density, the researcher needs to impose some structure. For example, studying the equilibrium under a certain asymmetric Triangular distribution is relatively straightforward, but studying it under any asymmetric distribution is di¢ cult. 17 The following discussion would apply under the assumption of complete plurality maximization, CPM, as well. For a de…nition of CPM, see Cox (1987) . In this paper, we study both the local and the global Nash Equilibrium of threecandidate competition in standard Downsian model with exogenous candidate valence. We show that, for a large set of valence di¤erences, a modulo symmetry unique LNE with an analytical characterization exists. We also show that the commonly used quadratic loss speci…cation signi…cantly restricts the set of parameters under which an LNE exists. For a PSNE to exist, the valence di¤erences need more structure. The PSNE of the base model does not exists in case (b), however, this feature disappears when one considers either asymmetric voter density, or plurality maximizing candidates. In PSNE of case (c), Candidate 2 receives a majority of votes. Under plurality maximization, this feature also disappears; when candidates are plurality maximizing in (still modulo symmetry unique) PSNE, the center candidate does not necessarily receive a majority of the votes. Interestingly, this PSNE in which V 2 < 1 2 is supported by another type of paradoxical behavior: in such an equilibrium, Candidate 2 does not move towards a low valence candidate as this would reduce his plurality, even though the move would secure him a majority. It is possible to impose other assumptions such as probabilistic voting where both features disappears. A detailed analysis of these cases is left for future research.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. To prove Proposition 1, we need the following three Lemmas. Consider competition between two candidates, j and k, where v j > v k . Let
Obviously when p j = p k all voters prefer candidate j, thus I(p j ; p k ) does not exist. However, Lemma 1 Whenever candidates choose non-identical policy platforms, (i) there always exists a unique location of indi¤erence (Groseclose 2005 , Appendix III), and (ii) I(p j ; p k ) is closer to the candidate with lower valence.
The location of indi¤erence determines the equilibrium locations of candidates with relatively lower valences. Let P k (p j ) denote the best response correspondence for candidate k. Then, if k receives a non-zero vote share in his best response, then
we have I(p j ; p k ) 2 P k (p j ) (with equality if p j 6 = 0). To see this, note that,
where j = I(p j ; p k ) p j , k = I(p j ; p k ) p k , and sgn(:) denotes the sign function.
Lemma 2 Candidate k's best response correspondence always includes a location of indi¤erence. Furthermore, if Candidate k receives any votes in that location, then
, and, unless p j = 0, the best response correspondence is single valued (where
Proof. Let us …x p j 6 = 0. Now consider Candidate k's "conditional" best response,
is positive, and the sign of
is determined by the sign of I(p j ; p k )
. Now, if I = R, then for p k > I(p j ; p k ), we have dV k dp k < 0, and for p k < I(p j ; p k ), we have dV k dp k > 0. But, by A1 (ii), the only stable location for Candidate k is that of the indi¤erent voter, i.e., for p k = I(p j ; p k ) we have
. Now, let us assume that Candidate
Hug (1995) 
where I 3 = I(p 2 ; p 3 ), and I 1 = I(p 2 ; p 1 ). We assumed that L(:) 2 C 2 , then by implicit function theorem, whenever it exists, I(p 2 ; p j ) is also locally C 2 . One can show that, when p 1 < p 2 < p 3 , we have
Hence, evaluating the second derivatives at
we …nd
establishing the su¢ cient condition in Proposition 1, and completing the Proof of Proposition 1. 
. None of the high-valence candidates has any incentive to move to the left of z, as this would reduce that candidate's vote share below F (z). The su¢ cient condition guarantees that moving in…nitesimally to the right does not increase a highvalence candidate's vote share either, i.e., lim dp!0 + V 2 (z; z + dp; z + L 1 ( 3 )) < 0.
To obtain the su¢ cient condition from this inequality, note that evaluating (2) Proof of Proposition 4 Note that by Propositions 1, 2, and 3 we know p j maximizes V j (p j ; p j ) locally for LNE and globally for PSNE. Here we need to show that it maximizes V j (p j ; p j ) max k6 =j fV k (p j ; p j )g as well.
For part (i), consider the cases of (b) and (c) …rst. We need to show that a local deviation by a candidate does not increase his plurality when the rest are located at their LNE policy platforms. Let us consider a low valence candidate j who is maximizing his plurality V j (p j ; p j ) V k (p j ; p j ). In his LNE location, his plurality is either negative, i.e., k = 2, or equal to zero. Note, once more, that at his current location this low-valence candidate is competing only against Candidate 2. Therefore by a local deviation his plurality cannot increase. To see why, note that with any such deviation V j (p j ; p j ) decreases (by the argument in the proof of Lemma 2, any local deviations would decrease his vote share) and V k (p j ; p j ) either does not change, 18 Of course, by symmetry, one could assume p 3 p 2 , then (ii) would read 1 F (p 1 ) = For part (ii), we again use numerical simulations to show the existence of PSNE.
